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Abstract 
The Japanese banking industry is an interesting one, given chronic problems related to 
notorious non-performing loans, originated back in the 1990s, but also due to an 
unprecedented monetary expansion. In this paper, we focus on the impact of quantitative 
easing on bank level risk, while controlling for bank competition. We opt for a measure of 
bank specific risk-taking based on a new data set of bankrupt and restructured loans. Given 
issues related to endogeneity among the main variables, we adopt dynamic panel threshold 
and panel vector autoregression analyses that address such criticism. Results demonstrate 
that quantitative easing reduces bankrupt and restructured loan ratios, though we do not 
observe a similar impact on bank stability. Given the adoption of negative rates in January 
2016 by the Bank of Japan, our study comes is timely and provides insightful implications for 
future research. 
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1. Introduction
The association between quantitative easing and bank risk-taking has raised concerns 
among academics and policymakers alike (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Claeys & Darvas, 2015). 
Low short-term interest rates prior to loan issuance result in banks granting more new risky 
loan portfolios, distorting their credit supply to favour borrowers with worse credit 
histories, lower ex-ante internal ratings, and weaker ex-post performance (Ioannidou et al., 
2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). Lower returns from yields is another motive for financial 
institutions to accelerate their risk-taking activities (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Rajan, 2005). 
Banking surveys based on credit standards in the US and the UK, by contrast, do not suggest 
an excessive risk-taking by banks as a result of the enforcement of quantitative easing 
(Claeys & Darvas, 2015). However, the literature has not been settled to date about the 
impact of quantitative easing on bank risk taking. Herein, we explore a new data set and 
measure bank risk at bank level using new Japanese nonperforming loans information.  In 
addition, the Bank of Japan has been the pioneer in empowering quantitative easing 
policies. There has been a strong record of active and aggressive quantitative easing since 
2010. We are interested in investigating whether the warning of heightened risks associated 
with this policy is supported by Japanese bank level data. We hypothesise, based on the 
aforementioned literature, that quantitative easing could affect bank risk-taking.  
After the acute phase of the banking crisis in Japan (1997-1999), the banking system 
underwent major reforms, bailout and consolidation from 1999 to 2003. As a response to 
the banking crisis, between 2000 and 2012, quantitative easing was launched twice: firstly, 
during March 2001-March 2006 and secondly from October 2010 onwards to date. Given 
this extensive monetary expansion, it is of interest to examine its impact on bank 
performance. We also control for the degree of competition in the banking industry 
(Altunbas et al., 2014). We explore in depth the underlying causality among quantitative 
easing, competition and risk.  
Apart from Japan’s commitment to do “whatever it takes” in achieving growth 
through quantitative easing, Japan is of interest for the infamous nonperforming loan 
problem. This destructive effect of the banking crisis prolonged to the first half of the 2000s 
due to the reluctance of the government in admitting the nonperforming loan issue. 
Eventually, when doing nothing was too painful to tolerate, the government restructured 
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the whole banking industry. However, this restructuring campaign was not without 
controversy as it incorporated funding of unprofitable firms, which in turn crowded out 
solvent firms and lengthened the revitalisation of the economy (Caballero et al., 2006). 
Moreover, there exists evidence of political influence, with regulators deferring to declare 
the solvency of banks situated in prefectures supporting the then ruling party (Imai, 2009). 
When quantitative easing was first introduced, structural reforms of the financial system 
were essential for the policy to gain its full effectiveness (Bank of Japan, 2001). After the 
global financial crisis, nonperforming loans of all banks increased slightly from JPY11.4 
trillion in March 2008 to JPY12 trillion in March 2009.1 It is noteworthy that during 2008-
2013, the government strategically aimed to assist small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
which are Regional Banks’ primary corporate clients, via the SME Financing Facilitation Act. 
One term in the Act involved reclassifying SME’s nonperforming loans. This raised the 
accumulated hidden credit risks within the banking system (Hoshi, 2011), as about 3-6% of 
total credit in Regional Banks was reclassified (International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we opt for an 
original data set to capture bank risk that has been overseen by the literature to date. Bank 
risk-taking, our primary focus, is represented by bankrupt loan ratio and restructured loan 
ratio. Data on bankrupt and restructured loans are available for Japanese commercial banks 
and have not been used extensively in the Japanese banking literature (Mamatzakis et al., 
2016). We also use the classic measure of bank default risk, the Z-score, to enhance the 
robustness of our analyses. The use of bankrupt and restructured loans at semi-annual data 
frequency allows an enriched information set in our modelling of competition and 
quantitative easing.2 Second, we employ a bank level proxy of quantitative easing – the 
bank specific lending rate. The advantages of this microeconomic measure lie in the absence 
of aggregation bias and the ample set of information. This bank-specific variable ensures its 
compatibility with the bank level Boone indicator and risks in our analyses. We also conduct 
the analyses with two other proxies for quantitative easing: the 10-year Japanese 
government bond yield and the total assets of the Bank of Japan. In addition, we also 
                                                          
1
 Source: Japan Financial Services Agency. 
2
 Bankrupt loans are loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans by 6 months or more. 
Restructured loans are named after the sum of past due loans by 3 months but less than 6 months and 
restructured loans. See Data section and Appendix A for more details. 
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control for bank competition by estimating the Boone indicator at bank level. Thirdly, to 
account for potential endogeneity, we employ the dynamic panel threshold analysis, where 
Generalised Methods of Moments type estimators are used (Kremer et al., 2013). This 
methodology allows us to examine whether these relationships are stable over the observed 
period (financial years from 2000 to 2014) which embraces quite a few important events. 
They are: the final phase of the banking crisis (2000-2001), the restructuring period (2001-
2003), the presence of quantitative easing (2001-2006 and from 2010), the global financial 
crisis (2007-2008), and the Tohoku earthquake (2011). The advantage of dynamic threshold 
analysis is that structural events are not set exogenously, but are rather revealed by the 
threshold analysis. Lastly, we extend our analysis by using a panel vector autoregression (p-
VAR) approach to address the underlying causality between quantitative easing and bank 
risk. 
Our results show that quantitative easing reduces bank risk in terms of bankrupt and 
restructured loan ratios. However, quantitative easing appears to undermine overall bank 
stability. The results could entail the countervailing effects of quantitative easing on bank 
risk-taking (Buch et al., 2014; De Nicolò et al., 2010). Although quantitative easing mitigates 
the interest rate burden for borrowers and inflates the value of pledged assets, it may 
induce banks to engage in riskier projects in the search for higher yield. Along these lines, 
Jiménez et al. (2014) argue that low interest rates reduce the probability of default for 
current variable rate loans, but at the same time banks tend to issue new loans to 
borrowers with worse credit ratings. Regarding the causality between the variables of 
interest, the panel VAR analysis suggests that quantitative easing does indeed generate this 
causal relationship between risk and competition. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and associated 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the methodologies. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 
discusses the results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature and the quantitative easing and risk hypothesis  
In this section, we establish our research hypothesis based on the literature regarding 
the relationship between quantitative easing and bank risk. After a long history of nearly 
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zero policy rates during the 1990s to avoid a deflationary slump (Leigh, 2010), the Bank of 
Japan initiated the policy of quantitative easing in March 2001 through long-term 
government bond purchases. Thereafter, assets purchased were broadened to private 
assets held by private banks, asset-backed securities and asset-backed commercial papers 
(Girardin & Moussa, 2011). Officially ended in March 2006, the first quantitative easing 
period did not firmly prove its effectiveness in extracting the economy from the deflationary 
cycle (Bowman et al., 2015; Ueda, 2012; Ugai, 2007). 
The importance of quantitative easing has been addressed in relation to its potentially 
significant impact on aggregate demand, financial markets and economic growth (Bowman 
et al., 2015; Glick & Leduc, 2012; Schenkelberg & Watzka, 2013). Regarding its effect on the 
banking system, the bank lending channel is emphasised as a main conduit (Bowman et al., 
2015; Hosono, 2006). As Lucas (2014) points out, the success of quantitative easing (in the 
US) is partly indicated by increased risk-taking and, hence, more bank lending. Starting with 
the zero lower bound interest rate policy, Hosono (2006) investigates the different impacts 
of expansionary monetary policy on bank lending. This paper addresses the three important 
bank characteristics, namely size, liquidity and capitalisation, which could alter a bank’s 
reaction to the monetary policy stance. Results indicate that expansionary monetary policy 
in Japan is less effective for undercapitalised banks. Lending of small, less liquid and well-
capitalised banks are more exposed to monetary policy shocks than their counterparts.  
Inspired by Hosono (2006) but slightly more comprehensive is Bowman et al. (2015), 
which particularly focuses on the first quantitative easing period. Bowman et al. (2015) 
show that bank lending, consequent on quantitative easing, is transmitted through the 
liquidity channel. However, the results suggest that the liquidity injection of the central bank 
was inhibited by interbank illiquidity, thus the size of the boost to credit was relatively small. 
Unlike the findings of Hosono (2006), less-capitalised banks benefit more from quantitative 
easing than their well-capitalised peers. Weaker banks, in terms of higher nonperforming 
loan to asset ratios, also appear to be more sensitive to the liquidity injection. Bank size is 
reported to be insignificant in affecting the relationship between bank lending growth and 
liquidity. Kobayashi et al. (2006) also find evidence to support the conclusion that financially 
weaker banks and firms reap more benefits from quantitative easing through positive 
excess stock returns. 
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To this end, to the best of our knowledge, no study has established a clear link 
between quantitative easing in Japan and bank risk-taking using bank level information. 
Academics and policymakers have addressed the potentially disproportionate bank risk-
taking associated with the enactment of quantitative easing (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Claeys 
& Darvas, 2015). Quantitative easing is supposed to encourage financial institutions to 
attempt socially desirable risk-taking. However, banks may deviate from their secured path 
when excessive risk-taking is recorded (Claeys & Darvas, 2015). In addition, under lax 
lending standards and low interest rates, the likelihood is that the number of more risky 
borrowers being offered new loans could rise, and so could credit risk (Ioannidou et al., 
2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). The countervailing effect of interest rate changes on bank risk is 
also addressed in Buch et al. (2014). Lower interest rates could reduce the cost burden for 
borrowers, increase the collateral value, and subsequently raise the likelihood of 
repayment. At the same time, borrowing capacity rises with higher collateral prices, and 
banks are induced to engage in riskier projects to offset their lower profits due to lower 
interest rates. On the contrary, Lucas (2014) argues that quantitative easing could 
unintentionally reduce bank risk-taking incentives. Banks benefit from the term premium in 
the yield curve if the maturity of their assets exceeds that of their liabilities. When the yield 
curve is flat, they may be discouraged to issue long-term loans which may be more desirable 
for borrowers. 
In this regard, we leave our quantitative easing-risk hypothesis open: The 
implementation of quantitative easing could lead to either an increase or a reduction in bank 
risk. 
 
3. Methodology - Dynamic panel threshold analysis 
To examine the quantitative easing-risk nexus, we adopt the dynamic panel threshold 
model introduced by Kremer et al. (2013). This methodology allows for the estimation of a 
threshold effect within a panel data framework involving endogenous regressors. Apart 
from tackling endogeneity concerns, another advantage of this methodology in the case of 
Japanese banking is that no a priori assumption is needed with regard to structural breaks. 
Such breaks, within the threshold model, are endogenously determined from the underlying 
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data generating process. The model estimates threshold values for quantitative easing over 
time, which in turn signify regime changes. 
In some detail, the model specification is written as: 
 
yit =mi +b1qitI qit £g( )+d1I qit £g( )+b2qitI qit >g( )+jzit +eit i = 1,...,N( ), t = 1,...,T( )
  
where indicates bank-specific fixed effect3; I(.) is the indicator function indicating the 
regime defined by the threshold variable (qit) and the threshold level γ; qit is both the 
threshold variable and the regime-dependent regressor, whereas zit is a vector of control 
variables, which may include both endogenous and exogenous variable. 
As in Kremer et al. (2013), we account for the regime intercept (δ1) because omitting 
the intercept may result in biases in the threshold estimates and regression slopes (Bick, 
2010).eit is the error term.
4 As in Caner and Hansen (2004) and Kremer et al. (2013), we 
estimate equation (1) using GMM to account for endogeneity. The first lag of the 
endogenous variable is used as the instrument. 
 
4. Data 
Our data are extracted from semi-annual financial reports of Japanese commercial 
banks published on the Japanese Bankers Association website. Our sample consists of 3491 
observations for financial years 2000 to 2014. Three particular types of commercial banks 
are examined, namely City Banks, Regional Banks I and Regional Banks II. They form more 
than half the banking system and correspond to various types of operations. If City Banks 
are more involved in different aspects of banking business, Regional Banks are prone to 
                                                          
3
 To eliminate bank-specific fixed effects, as suggested by Kremer et al (2013), we employ the forward 
orthogonal deviations transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995).  
4
 The estimation procedure is as follows. First, a reduced-form regression is estimated for endogenous 
variables as a function of the instrumental variables. Second, using least squares, we estimate equation (1) for 
a fixed threshold with the predicted values of endogenous variables obtained from the first step regression. 
Third, the second step regression is repeated to find the estimator of the threshold value associated with the 
smallest sum of squared residuals. The critical values for the 95% confidence intervals of the threshold value 
are: , with  is the 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio 
statistic  (Caner & Hansen, 2004). The slope coefficients are estimated by GMM procedure for the 
formerly used instruments and estimated threshold. 
i
     CLR  :  C
 LR
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conventional banking activities. City Banks are referred as Main Banks in the horizontal 
keiretsu network – the enterprise groups consisting of one large firm for every major sector 
pre- and post-crisis. These banks act as the core of the business group and offer venture 
capital for affiliates. The number of City Banks has declined over time since the crisis 
occurred in the 1990s. Besides, during the restructuring period, City Banks benefited from 
mergers which empowered their resistance to overcome the consequences of the crisis5.  
The operating locations of Regional Banks are refined by their scope of business, with 
smaller geographic region restriction for Regional Banks II. These banks are the smallest in 
comparison with the other two. Unlike City Banks, Regional Banks mainly invest in 
government bonds and originate loans for small and medium firms in their specific areas 
where their head offices are located. Thus, Regional Banks are more committed to the local 
development of the prefectures. There are other different kinds of banks currently 
operating in Japan, for example, Trust Banks, Long-Term Credit Banks, Shinkin banks (credit 
cooperatives), and foreign banks. Due to data unavailability or differences in business 
features, we do not include non-commercial banks in our study. 
As dependent variables representing bank risk-taking, we opt for bankrupt loans to 
total assets (BRL ratio), restructured loans to total assets (RSL ratio), and the natural 
logarithm of Z-score6. The first two variables characterise credit risk, whereas the remaining 
variable is a proxy for overall bank stability. They are incorporated respectively in the model 
to analyse the highlighted hypotheses. Bankrupt and restructured loans are obtained from 
data of risk-monitored loans disclosed under the Banking Law (see Appendix A). Bankrupt 
loans are the sum of bankrupt loans and non-accrual loans,7 while restructured loans are 
the sum of past due loans by 3 months or more but less than 6 months, and restructured 
loans.8 The ratios of these risk-monitored loans to assets capture credit risk, similar to the 
                                                          
5
 Mitsui Bank and Taiyo-Kobe Bank to form Sakura Bank; Fuji, Dai-Ichi Kanyo, and Industrial Bank of Japan to 
form Mizuho Bank; Sanwa and Tokai Banks to form UFJ Banks; UFJ Banks and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi; 
Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank (Nakamura, 2006) . 
6
 Nonperforming loan ratio and Z-score are used extensively in the literature to represent bank risk (Agoraki et 
al., 2011; Beck, 2008; Buch et al., 2012). 
7
 Reported in Japanese commercial banks’ balance sheets, these loans are named loans to borrowers in legal 
bankruptcy, and past due loans in arrears by six months or more. 
8
 The Japanese Bankers Association originally defined restructured loans as loans of which interest rates were 
lowered. In 1997, the definition was extended to loans with any amended contract conditions and loans to 
corporations under on-going reorganisation (Montgomery & Shimizutani, 2009). 
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nonperforming loan to asset ratio that has been widely used in the literature to test for the 
competition-fragility nexus (Beck, 2008). Bank stability indicated by the Z-score is another 
gauge for the likelihood of bank failure (Beck et al., 2013; Laeven & Levine, 2009). This is 
defined as the number of standard deviations below the mean of return on assets that 
would result in insolvency by evaporating capital ( ) 
(Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005).  
To ensure the robustness of our estimation, we analyse the dynamic panel threshold 
model with two proxies for competition, the Boone indicator and the Lerner index, with the 
former being our primary interest. With regard to quantitative easing, we choose the bank-
specific lending rate calculated as interest income on loans divided by loans and bills 
discounted9. We employ the bank-specific lending rate as the threshold variable for 
quantitative easing for several reasons. First, under the zero lower bound, short-term 
interest rates are inoperative (Girardin & Moussa, 2011). Second, the Bank of Japan loan 
rate, uncollateralised overnight call rates, and the Bank of Japan’s total reserves, the 
amount of asset purchases, and government bond yields do not reflect individual bank 
characteristics in relation to changes in quantitative easing. Third, we could avoid 
aggregation bias and enhance the compatibility of quantitative easing proxy with the 
dependent variable and the Boone indicator. We also control for the impact of competition. 
As quantitative easing influences deposit interest rates, it may in turn affect bank 
competition in the loan market. In addition, one may argue that lending rate is not a direct 
measure of quantitative easing, and may be affected by competition. To tackle the potential 
endogeneity between the three main variables of interest, we treat them as endogenous in 
the dynamic panel threshold model.10 For robustness, we also use the 10-year Japanese 
government bond yield and the Bank of Japan total assets (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012) as 
alternative proxies for quantitative easing. 
Regarding a subset of explanatory variables, we specify a number of control variables 
varying from bank characteristics to macroeconomic impact. To account for capitalisation 
                                                          
9
 We could also use the amount of asset purchases or Japanese government bond’s yield as measures for 
quantitative easing (Bowman et al., 2015; Lyonnet & Werner, 2012; Voutsinas & Werner, 2011). 
10
 We use the first lag of the endogenous variable as its instrument to preserve information. Following Kremer 
et al. (2013), all available lags of the endogenous regressor are also examined. In fact, the corresponding 
results reveal little variation in the parameters estimated.  
  itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /
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and the potential moral hazard problem, we use the capital to assets ratio (Tabak et al., 
2012)11. Bank size is taken as the natural logarithm of total assets. We also take into 
consideration the impact of revenue diversification which is the ratio of non-interest income 
to total operating income (Anginer et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2013), assets diversification 
represented by the ratio of securities to assets (Zhang et al., 2013), and liquidity which is 
defined as liquid assets12 to total assets (Jeon et al., 2011). GDP growth is included to reflect 
the influence of macroeconomic environment (Jiménez et al., 2013). Market capitalisation 
accounts for financial market development and also functions as an alternative source of 
funds for incumbent firms (Beck et al., 2013). Descriptive statistics of data used are 
displayed in Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We also measure competition at bank level using the Boone indicator (see Appendix B 
for the exposition of the Boone indicator). The average Boone indicator for the entire 
sample from 2000 to 2014 is estimated at -0.0542.13 Reported in Mirzaei and Moore (2014), 
the average Boone indicator for Japanese banking between 1999 and 2011 is -0.02.14 Figure 
1 illustrates the mean value of the Boone indicator over time for all banks in our sample. Its 
highest score in absolute value is recorded in March 2002 at -0.0813, indicating the toughest 
degree of competition for the entire period. During the restructuring period (September 
2000 to March 2003), the government imposed policy changes on the banking system in 
order to revitalise its resilience to the aftermaths of the crisis. In addition, 
undercapitalisation and the threat of nonperforming loans induced fragile banks to agree to 
merger proposals from financially healthier banks. The consolidation tendency was 
augmented by a number of mergers between large City Banks, indicating an adverse phase 
for too-big-to-fail banks in maintaining their market power. Afterwards, the average score 
slightly increased to -0.0483 in March 2004, only to remain relatively constant until 
                                                          
11
 As capital ratio is part of the formula of Z-score, we exclude it from models in which lnZ-score is used. 
12
 Liquid assets = Cash and due from banks + call loans + receivables under resale agreements + receivables 
under securities borrowing transactions + bills bought + monetary claims bought + trading assets + trading 
account securities + money held in trust (Radić, 2014). 
13
 Delis (2012) includes Japan in the sample of 84 countries. The average Boone indicator for Japanese banks 
during 1988-2005 is -0.584.  
14
 Note that the data are obtained from World Bank for the whole banking system. 
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September 2008. This may serve as evidence in supporting the positive outcomes of 
government intervention. Within that time frame, the turbulence caused by the huge 
amount of nonperforming loans had been alleviated gradually. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
There was a shift in the Boone indicator which signified higher competition during the 
US subprime crisis. At the end of March 2009, the corresponding Boone indicator dropped 
from -0.0489 (in September 2008) to -0.0659. The contagion of the global financial crisis 
possibly caused Japanese banks to deviate from their profit goals. The deterioration in 
profit, in turn, could reduce bank market power. Between September 2009 and September 
2012, the Boone indicator had a similar stable trend as after the restructuring period, before 
slightly decreasing towards the end of the sample period. 
The corresponding stiff competition is identified by higher absolute values of the 
Boone indicator. There is no specific benchmark for the value of  in general, yet what we 
have found implies a moderate degree of competition in the banking sector, as the figures 
are not too distant from zero. Table 2 provides further insight of competition among each 
bank type. In general, competition within City Banks (-0.0654) and Regional Banks II (-
0.0559) are more intense than between Regional Banks I (-0.0518). The largest magnitude 
(absolute value) of Boone indicator is recorded for City Banks in March 2002 at -0.1906. The 
trend of competition in City Banks during the restructuring period is more volatile than 
those in the other two types, indicating the effect of the aforementioned consolidation 
tendency. The onset of the US credit crunch 2007-2008 seemed to impose a pronounced 
effect on competition between Regional Banks II, notably at -0.0809 in March 2009. A 
potential explanation could rest on the size factor which may denote a bank’s resistance to 
external shocks. Regional Banks II are the smallest compared to the other two and operate 
under more limited geographic restrictions. Hence, the potentially high likelihood that 
Regional Banks II being more exposed to exogenous shocks would erode their profits and 
weaken their market power. Nevertheless, competition in Regional Banks II appeared to be 
more relatively stable compared to City Banks and Regional Banks I after the global financial 
crisis. 

13 
 
We also compute the Lerner index for comparison purposes (see Appendix B for its 
estimation). The trend of the Lerner index over time illustrated in Figure 1 concurs with the 
previous findings of the Boone indicator.15 Our result reveals that the average Lerner index 
is 0.2565, with some variation across bank types (the average Lerner index reported for 
Japanese banks from 2003 to 2010 in Fu et al. (2014) is 0.2521). The level of competition is 
relatively tougher for City Banks (0.1467) and Regional Banks II (0.2421) than for Regional 
Banks I (0.2777), in line with the rank of Boone indicators formerly reported for three types. 
The trend of the Lerner index over time is very similar to the pattern of the Boone indicator 
(see Fig. 1). The two points expressing the strongest competitive environment are also 
observed in March 2002 and March 2009. Our results, however, are different from findings 
of Liu and Wilson (2013), possibly because they obtain the Lerner index by estimating the 
whole banking system, including Trust Banks, Shinkin Banks and Credit cooperatives during 
2000-2009. Concerning the three types in our sample, Liu and Wilson (2013) find that City 
Banks have the greatest market power, followed by Regional Banks I and Regional Banks II. 
A similar interpretation is drawn by Montgomery et al. (2014) as large banks enjoy greater 
market power post-mergers. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Quantitative easing and risk:  quantitative easing as the threshold variable 
Findings for the risk-quantitative easing nexus are reported in Table 3. There exists a 
positive relationship between lending rate and risk in all different model specifications 
(columns 1 to 3). A rise in the lending rate is found to increase bankrupt/restructured loan 
ratios and lnZ-score, statistically significant in both regimes. When risk is measured by the 
bankrupt loan ratio and the restructured loan ratio, the threshold value is identified at 
1.2052% (column 1) and 1.0562% (column 2). When the lnZ-score is used, the threshold 
value is 0.9401% (column 3). To this end, quantitative easing is beneficial in terms of 
reducing credit risk. The effect is more prominent in the high regimes, where the 
                                                          
15
 There are some exceptional cases when market power characterised by the Lerner index is negative, but 
occasionally found. Agoraki et al. (2011) and Fu et al. (2014) explain the implication of negative Lerner index by 
the non-optimising behaviour of banks which are unable to price above marginal cost. 
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coefficients are 0.037 (column 1) and 0.0385 (column 2). Although the coefficients indicating 
the impact of the lending rate on risk-monitored loan ratios in the low regimes are 
statistically significant, the magnitude is quite negligible (0.0088 and 0.0063 in columns 1 
and 2, respectively). Nevertheless, this favourable effect of lower risky loan ratios associated 
with quantitative easing may come at the expense of bank stability. The reason is that, as 
reported in column 3, the lnZ-score is also reduced, given an aggressive quantitative easing 
policy. Notably, the magnitude of the coefficients for the impact of the lending rate provides 
insightful implications. Compared to the detrimental effect that quantitative easing could 
impose on bank stability (0.3416 and 0.2833 in the low and high regimes, respectively), the 
beneficial impact that it exerts on credit risk is quite small. In a nutshell, comparing the 
results to the hypotheses set out in section 2, we can conclude that quantitative easing 
could lower credit risk but may harm overall bank stability. 
In an attempt to explain the aforementioned findings, the implication of variability in 
our results could be interpreted by the countervailing effect of low interest rates on bank 
risk-taking as discussed in Buch et al. (2014). On the one hand, quantitative easing may 
reduce risk, as it aims to facilitate lending so that increased investment can boost economic 
growth. Both banks and borrowers can benefit from ample liquidity injected by quantitative 
easing to strengthen their resistance to exogenous shocks. Low interest rates would 
encourage more potential borrowers to apply for funding because of a greater probability of 
fulfilling their repayment duties. As evidenced in Jiménez et al. (2014), a low interest rate 
reduces the interest burden on existing loans for borrowers. Therefore, lower 
bankrupt/restructured loan ratios would be expected. On the other hand, quantitative 
easing could amplify risk. When banks foresee an extended period of low interest rate, they 
may alter their risk-taking appetite towards riskier projects to pursue greater gains 
(Altunbas et al., 2014; Gambacorta, 2009). In more detail, low yield and abundant liquidity 
accelerate asset prices and promote leverage, in turn inducing excessive risk-taking 
(Dell'Ariccia et al., 2010). A larger loanable proportion of collateral and the search for yield 
(Rajan, 2005) may drive banks to grant more risky loan portfolios (Jiménez et al., 2014), or 
to invest in higher yield-higher risk instruments. Another risk-taking channel could be 
through a typical type of moral hazard, where banks realise the continuity of quantitative 
easing policy in difficult economic times. As Altunbas et al. (2014) argue, banks may perceive 
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the presence of a so-called insurance effect, in which monetary easing during a financial 
downturn is expected to decelerate the fall of asset values. The prediction of a lower 
probability of large downside risk, therefore, would magnify bank risk-taking. This 
perception may well be the case of prolonged low interest rate and extensive quantitative 
easing in Japan. Taken together, these arguments could explain for lower bank stability 
corresponding to quantitative easing. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Interestingly, in terms of control variables, the results reveal a negative association 
between the Boone indicator and risk-monitored loan ratios. Hence, greater competition 
would be harmful for banks because of higher bankrupt/restructured loan ratios. This 
finding is reinforced by the positive association between the Boone indicator and the lnZ-
score in column 3, indicating higher bank stability under conditions of lower competition. In 
particular, in terms of diminishing risk and enhancing bank soundness, there are four 
variables: the capital ratio, asset diversification, liquidity and market capitalisation. In 
contrast, higher GDP growth is found to increase risk-monitored loan ratios, probably due to 
the softened lending standards during good economic times (Dell'Ariccia & Marquez, 2006). 
Turning to the Z-score, there is a favourable impact on bank stability during economic 
upturn and when banks divert their focus to noninterest income. Bank stability increases 
with larger bank size, while the bankrupt loan ratio decreases. 
The number of banks in each regime is shown in Table 4. Analysing the trend of the 
number of observations in column 1, we observe a significant increase of banks in the low 
regime after the global financial crisis. Especially, from March 2011 to March 2015, almost 
all banks in the sample charged less than 1.2052% lending rate. Note that this time frame 
covers the on-going quantitative easing policy (since October 2010). Illustrated in column 3, 
the distribution of the number of banks in the low regime provides further evidence for the 
initial quantitative easing period. Recall that the threshold value for column 3 is 0.9401%, 
which is lower than the values for columns 1 (1.2052%) and 2 (1.0562%). From September 
2003 to March 2006, the number of banks charging lending rate lower than 0.9401% 
increased monotonically. This tendency indicates the effect of the first quantitative easing 
period (March 2001-March 2006). In the high regimes of all model specifications, it is 
confirmed that the number of observations gradually decreased during this period. 
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 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 5, we use the 10-year Japanese government bond yield (columns 1 to 3) and 
Bank of Japan assets (columns 4 to 6) to replace lending rate as the threshold variable. The 
results show a positive influence of bond yield on the lnZ-score in both regimes of column 3. 
This is in line with the previous findings that quantitative easing reduces bank stability 
(reported in column 3 of Table 3). The magnitude of the impact in the high regime (0.6513, 
column 3) is also notable compared to other models. Interestingly, the bond yield affects 
risk-monitored loan ratios differently in two regimes. There is a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the bond yield and the bankrupt/restructured loan ratios in 
the high regimes. The coefficients on the bond yield’s impact are 0.0131 (column 1) and 
0.0107 (column 2). This relationship turns out negative in the low regimes (-0.017 in column 
1 and -0.0149 in column 2). It is also worth noting that the absolute magnitudes of the 
impact of bond yield on risk-monitored loans in the two regimes are approximately the 
same (around 0.01). Additionally, the threshold value is consistently realised at 1.032%. 
Thus, when the bond yield is below 1.032%, quantitative easing increases credit risk. In this 
regard, more aggressive quantitative easing would encourage banks to take on more risk. 
First, banks may tend to soften lending standards due to low yield and interest rate, thereby 
issuing loans to less creditworthy borrowers (Jiménez et al., 2014). Second, as Ioannidou et 
al. (2015) argue, due to low monetary policy rate, banks may be less concerned about the 
compensation which should be required for the higher risk taken. In fact, Ioannidou et al. 
(2015) find that during monetary expansion, banks charge riskier borrowers relatively less 
than what they should. When the bond yield is greater than 1.032%, quantitative easing 
reduces credit risk, similar to our previous conclusion drawn from lending rate (Table 3). 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The bond yield is lower than the threshold value (1.032%) in March 2003, September 
2010, and from September 2011 to March 2015. The last time frame includes the current 
quantitative easing period. If we combine this finding with the aforementioned impact of 
the threshold, the on-going quantitative easing may pose a threat to the banking system by 
augmenting credit risk. Regarding control variables, similar to the results reported in Table 
3, we also find that competition increases credit risk and bank fragility. Larger size, a higher 
capital ratio, more liquidity, greater asset diversification, revenue diversification and market 
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capitalisation would help lower credit risk. Higher GDP growth, on the other hand, would 
increase credit risk exposure. In terms of bank stability, it would be enhanced with larger 
bank size, more diversified income, higher GDP growth, and greater market capitalisation. 
A first glance at columns 4 to 6, where the Bank of Japan total assets are used as a 
proxy for quantitative easing, reveals a consistent estimate of the threshold value at JPN 
118,437,502 million. There is a negative association between the Bank of Japan’s balance 
sheet size and risk variables. For credit risk, this relationship is statistically significant in the 
low regime (-0.0347 in column 4 and -0.0286 in column 5), implying a favourable impact of 
quantitative easing. The influence of the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet size on risk-
monitored loan ratios in the high regime is insignificant. Differently, for bank stability, when 
the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet is greater than the threshold, a more aggressive 
quantitative easing policy would reduce bank soundness (-0.1709 in column 6). The 
relationship between quantitative easing and bank stability is insignificant in the low 
regime. These results strengthen those reported in columns 1 to 3, where the bond yield is 
the proxy for quantitative easing. Up to a certain level of asset purchases (JPN 118,437,502 
million), quantitative easing lessens credit risk. When the amount of asset purchases passed 
the threshold, quantitative easing reduces bank stability. 
The time frame in each regime complements these findings. First, the periods of high 
regimes coincide with the two quantitative easing periods. In particular, the amount of asset 
purchases, which were higher than the threshold, are recorded from March 2001 to March 
2006, and from March 2011 to March 2015. Hence, the additional asset purchases of the 
Bank were not really effective due to its detrimental impact on bank stability. Second, the 
period of low regimes falls in to the gap between the two quantitative easing periods, and 
also embraces the global financial crisis. During this interval (September 2006-September 
2010), more asset purchases would have mitigated credit risk. However, overall, the 
estimated impact suggests that the reduction in credit risk may not be considerable 
compared to the reduction in bank soundness (e.g. -0.0347 in column 4 versus -0.1709 in 
column 6). The influence of other control variables appears consistent as previously 
reported in columns 1 to 3 and in Table 3. 
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5.2 The panel VAR specification 
Given some variability in our results, which could be driven by endogeneity issues, we 
attempt to address the underlying dynamics between risk and quantitative easing. We 
adopt the methodology of panel vector autoregression (p-VAR) to account for the causality 
relationship as well as the existence of unobservable heterogeneity, specified by an 
individual specific term. An advantage of the model is its lack of assumptions about the 
relationship between variables. We treat all three variables in the equation system as 
endogenous.16 Risk, proxied by the bankrupt loan ratio, the restructured loan ratio, and the 
lnZ-score, is incorporated respectively in the analysis. The Boone indicator and lending rate 
are proxies for competition and quantitative easing, respectively. We also include bank size 
as an exogenous control variable because of its importance in the Japanese banking 
structure. As discussed in the Data section, City Banks are the biggest and operate in a wide 
range of geographic regions, whereas Regional Banks II are the smallest. The nature of 
banking business also varies across three types. Besides, two-big-to-fail City banks are at the 
centre of the keiretsu network as well as being the important nodes channelling the impact 
of quantitative easing. 
Following the estimation of panel VAR, we derive the Impulse Response Functions 
(IRFs) (Fig. 2 to 4), which enable us to interpret the reaction of one variable to a shock in 
another variable in the system. We also report the Variance Decomposition (VDCs) for 
forecast horizons of 5 and 10 periods to illustrate the variance of the response variable to a 
shock in another variable (Table 6). All model specifications satisfy stability condition.17 
                                                          
16
 Following Love and Ariss (2014), we run the model on lag order 1 to preserve information. 
17 The variables enter the equation system as endogenous, with the most exogenous ones appearing first 
(Love & Zicchino, 2006). Following Love and Zicchino (2006), fixed effects are removed by using the Helmert 
procedure (Arellano & Bover, 1995).  
The first order VAR model takes the form of: TtNieww tiitiit ,...,1;,...,1,1         
where wit is a vector of three random variables: quantitative easing QE, Competition Comp and risk R 
(bankrupt loan ratio, restructured loan ratio and lnZ-score), Φ is a 3x3 matrix of coefficients, μi is a vector of m 
individual effects, and ei,t is a multivariate white-noise vector of m residuals. The equation system to be 
estimated with lag order one is as follows:  
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 [INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In terms of the risk-quantitative easing nexus, in the short term, there is a positive and 
significant response of risk-monitored loan ratios to a one standard deviation shock in 
lending rate (Fig. 2-3, last row, first column). This positive reaction is similar to the findings 
in Table 3. There is no evidence for a significant response of bank stability to a shock in the 
lending rate. The diagrams also reveal insignificant responses of lending rate to shocks in 
risk variables. Thus, if there exists a positive shock in lending rate, which translates into 
decreased quantitative easing, credit risk could rise accordingly. Hence, the simulation base 
of panel VAR could reinforce the claim of lower credit risk as a result of quantitative easing.  
 [INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Regarding the risk-competition nexus, a shock to the Boone indicator has a negative 
and significant impact on bankrupt loan ratio (Fig.2, second row, first column). In terms of 
reverse causality, shocks in risk variables generate insignificant responses of the Boone 
indicator. Two scenarios can be at play to interpret the results. A positive shock in the 
Boone indicator which denote lower competition will lead to decreased credit risk and 
increased bank stability. Turning to the competition-quantitative easing linkage, a shock in 
the lending rate would generate a negative response in the Boone indicator, marginally 
significant in the short-run (Fig. 2-4, last row, second column). 
Complementing the findings of the IRFs, the VDCs show that changes in competition 
are important in explaining the variation in the bankrupt loan ratio (5.66%), the restructured 
loan ratio (1.26%) and the lnZ-score (12.79%) (Table 6, 10 periods). In contrast, about 0.36% 
and 12.4% variation in the Boone indicator is due to innovations from the restructured loan 
ratio and the lnZ-score, respectively. Variation in the bankrupt loan ratio does not explain 
the variation in competition at all. Findings from the IRFs and VDCs reveal that competition 
triggers its relationship with risk. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Regarding the risk-quantitative easing relationship, about 46.79% variation in 
bankrupt loan ratio is explained by variation in quantitative easing, while only 0.03% 
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variation in quantitative easing is explained by shocks in bankrupt loan ratio. Similarly, 
30.89% variation in restructured loan ratio is due to shocks in quantitative easing, while 
0.07% variation in quantitative easing is explained by changes in restructured loan ratio. 
Differently, changes in quantitative easing is not so important in explaining the variation of 
bank stability. The reason is that while 3.01% variation in lending rate is due to innovations 
in lnZ-score, only 0.68% variation in lnZ-score is attributed to variation in lending rate. To 
this end, along with results from the IRFs, quantitative easing is found to originate its 
relationship with risk. 
The variation in the Boone indicator indicated by variation in lending rate is 
distinguishably larger than the variation in lending rate explained by changes in the Boone 
indicator (8.35%, 6.14%, 10.3% in comparison to 0.01%, 0.01%, 0.12% in columns 1-3, 
respectively). A conclusion of the causality starting from quantitative easing to competition 
can be drawn. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our findings indicate that in an environment where quantitative easing is taking place, 
banks might find it more challenging to compete with their counterparts. To improve their 
competitiveness, banks could strengthen their competence from other aspects, e.g. 
capitalisation, liquidity, and asset diversification. Bank executives could enhance banking 
services by, e.g., diversifying their investments or increasing unconventional business 
activities to offer more benefits to their customers in time and cost savings. In addition, 
focusing on relationship banking, improving their flexibility in debt rollover, and operating 
more efficiently may also be among the tactics bringing banks ahead their rivals. The 
proposed threshold values for lending rates in this study may also be useful for bank 
managers to construct their risk management policy.  
For policymakers, e.g. the Japan Financial Services Agency, relaxing entry and exit for 
the banking industry, promoting small and medium sized banks, or disentangling business 
operation restrictions could create a competitive environment which in turn would diminish 
bank risk-taking. Policymakers could also encourage the mutual assistance prevailing under 
the keiretsu network. Note that a disadvantage of keiretsu affiliation is that main banks 
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could exert their monopoly power in loan financing. Our analyses show that attempts to 
discourage competition increase credit risk. Therefore, our results argue that keiretsu 
should be applied with extreme caution. 
Last but not least, to take into account the stability of the banking system while 
exercising quantitative easing, regulators may revise rules associated with the initial credit 
screening and barriers in lending principles. In more details, avoiding incorrect evaluations 
at the beginning of the loan generating process and complying with lending standards help 
banks lessen the possibilities of future uncertainty. These policies should not contradict but 
promote the efficacy of quantitative easing and Abenomics - the current monetary and 
economic growth policy. Given that the Bank of Japan has adopted negative interest rate in 
January 2016 for the first time in its history, Japan would warrant a very interesting platform 
for future research. If the negative interest rate could drive economic recovery, it would 
open up a new era for monetary policy. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
BRL ratio 0.0263 0.0219 0.0000 0.6765 
RSL ratio 0.0092 0.0093 0.0000 0.1958 
LnZscore 3.9335 0.5223 0.0000 5.6410 
Boone indicator -0.0542 0.0579 -1.6390 -0.0391 
Lerner index 0.2565 0.3365 -4.0314 0.7583 
Lending rate 0.0106 0.0024 0.0012 0.0366 
Size 14.5717 1.1591 12.0571 19.0109 
Capital ratio 0.0432 0.0240 -0.7882 0.1279 
Asset diversification 0.2394 0.0770 0.0000 0.4807 
Liquidity ratio 0.0722 0.0380 0.0089 0.3679 
Revenue diversification 0.2220 0.0817 0.0577 0.5445 
GDP growth 0.0032 0.0234 -0.0787 0.0543 
Bond yield 0.0122 0.0039 0.0041 0.0185 
Bank of Japan assets 18.7201 0.2530 18.3119 19.5192 
Market capitalisation 19.2235 0.2546 18.8248 19.6968 
Notes: This Table reports the descriptive statistics for key variables employed in the dynamic panel threshold 
analysis. Number of observations: 3491. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to 
assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills 
discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, 
liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, Bond 
yield: 10-year Japanese government bond yield, Bank of Japan assets and market capitalisation is in natural 
logarithm. S.D.: Standard deviation.,  
  itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /
27 
 
Table 2. Boone Indicator and Lerner Index per Bank Type. 
Variable Boone  Lerner 
Time City Regional 1 Regional 2  City Regional 1 Regional 2 
Sep-00 -0.0840 -0.0575 -0.0581  0.1337 0.2001 0.1732 
Mar-01 -0.1129 -0.0597 -0.0683  -0.1054 0.1321 0.1356 
Sep-01 -0.1332 -0.0605 -0.0886  -0.2174 0.1146 0.0830 
Mar-02 -0.1906 -0.0625 -0.0894  -0.7096 0.0647 0.0289 
Sep-02 -0.0517 -0.0535 -0.0795  0.0709 0.1813 0.1597 
Mar-03 -0.1206 -0.0515 -0.0810  -0.8319 0.1173 0.0257 
Sep-03 -0.0429 -0.0699 -0.0469  0.2166 0.2190 0.2822 
Mar-04 -0.0616 -0.0452 -0.0503  0.1374 0.3101 0.2645 
Sep-04 -0.0601 -0.0469 -0.0455  0.1992 0.3177 0.3030 
Mar-05 -0.0562 -0.0461 -0.0510  0.0917 0.3196 0.2993 
Sep-05 -0.0432 -0.0486 -0.0458  0.3346 0.3169 0.3385 
Mar-06 -0.0432 -0.0457 -0.0563  0.3082 0.3628 0.3086 
Sep-06 -0.0413 -0.0464 -0.0550  0.3191 0.3303 0.2757 
Mar-07 -0.0467 -0.0453 -0.0579  0.2326 0.3249 0.2593 
Sep-07 -0.0546 -0.0496 -0.0468  0.2172 0.2880 0.2889 
Mar-08 -0.0574 -0.0489 -0.0539  0.2117 0.2482 0.2143 
Sep-08 -0.0513 -0.0453 -0.0537  0.0899 0.1893 0.1809 
Mar-09 -0.0598 -0.0562 -0.0809  -0.0583 -0.0060 -0.0608 
Sep-09 -0.0428 -0.0433 -0.0452  0.1706 0.2947 0.2577 
Mar-10 -0.0445 -0.0443 -0.0493  0.2579 0.2994 0.2286 
Sep-10 -0.0483 -0.0440 -0.0453  0.3296 0.3270 0.3011 
Mar-11 -0.0435 -0.0442 -0.0442  0.2450 0.2942 0.2965 
Sep-11 -0.0458 -0.0438 -0.0446  0.3260 0.3461 0.3194 
Mar-12 -0.0579 -0.0464 -0.0438  0.3335 0.3280 0.3254 
Sep-12 -0.0513 -0.0436 -0.0435  0.2787 0.3167 0.3245 
Mar-13 -0.0586 -0.0605 -0.0426  0.3910 0.3630 0.3309 
Sep-13 -0.0916 -0.0519 -0.0437  0.4174 0.3879 0.3878 
Mar-14 -0.0419 -0.0612 -0.0439  0.3781 0.3673 0.3775 
Sep-14 -0.0450 -0.0642 -0.0430  0.4285 0.4013 0.3927 
Mar-15 -0.0438 -0.0663 -0.0451  0.3356 0.3895 0.3878 
Total -0.0654 -0.0518 -0.0559  0.1467 0.2777 0.2421 
Notes: This Table reports the average Boone indicator and the Lerner index per bank type over time. Sep: 
September; Mar: March; 00-15: 2000-2015. 
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Table 3. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Quantitative Easing-Risk Nexus (lending 
rate). 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 1.2052% 1.0562% 0.9401% 
95% confidence interval [0.9861% 1.2102%] [0.9613% 1.1205%] [0.9216% 1.0122%] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0088*** 0.0026 0.0063*** 0.0020 0.3416*** 
0.044
2 
High regime 0.0370*** 0.0090 0.0385*** 0.0036 0.2833*** 
0.075
1 
Intercept -0.1288*** 0.0417 
-
0.1469*** 0.0194 0.3061 
0.281
8 
Impact of covariates       
Boone -0.1359*** 0.0557 -0.079*** 0.0234 0.937*** 
0.335
0 
Size -0.014*** 0.0031 -0.0014 0.0022 0.1029*** 
0.035
6 
Capital ratio -0.5453*** 0.1079 -0.0560 0.0372   
Asset diversification -0.0791*** 0.0088 
-
0.0387*** 0.0055 0.1920 
0.188
9 
Liquidity -0.0619*** 0.0110 
-
0.0243*** 0.0076 0.1413 
0.236
8 
Revenue diversification -0.0068 0.0059 -0.0061 0.0042 0.2777*** 
0.077
1 
GDP growth 0.0387*** 0.0083 0.0297*** 0.0050 0.2827*** 
0.060
2 
Market capitalisation -0.002** 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0374*** 
0.010
7 
     
  
Obs in low regime 2352 
 
1789 
 
1090  
Obs in high regime 959 
 
1702 
 
2401  
Notes: This Table reports the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous 
variable (Boone) as its instrument. The threshold variable is lending rate. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, 
RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest 
income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest 
incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, 
Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table 4. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus. 
 1  2  3 
 BRL ratio  RSL ratio   lnZ-score 
 1.2052%  1.0562%  0.9401% 
 Low  High   Low  High   Low  High  
Sep-00 46 82  5 123  0 128 
Mar-01 45 80  2 123  0 125 
Sep-01 58 70  18 110  1 127 
Mar-02 60 65  35 90  2 123 
Sep-02 63 64  35 92  5 122 
Mar-03 65 56  36 85  9 112 
Sep-03 68 53  41 80  14 107 
Mar-04 74 46  44 76  15 105 
Sep-04 71 49  47 73  16 104 
Mar-05 78 41  54 65  25 94 
Sep-05 84 35  55 64  31 88 
Mar-06 90 27  61 56  41 76 
Sep-06 92 25  61 56  33 84 
Mar-07 80 36  53 63  19 97 
Sep-07 76 39  38 77  5 110 
Mar-08 75 39  37 77  2 112 
Sep-08 79 36  38 77  5 110 
Mar-09 87 27  52 62  10 104 
Sep-09 94 20  66 48  25 89 
Mar-10 96 16  71 41  43 69 
Sep-10 97 14  78 33  50 61 
Mar-11 102 9  82 29  62 49 
Sep-11 103 8  86 25  68 43 
Mar-12 106 5  91 20  75 36 
Sep-12 104 6  94 16  78 32 
Mar-13 106 4  98 12  85 25 
Sep-13 107 3  99 11  88 22 
Mar-14 108 2  101 9  90 20 
Sep-14 109 1  105 5  96 14 
Mar-15 109 1  106 4  97 13 
Obs 2532 959  1789 1702  1090 2401 
Notes: This Table reports the number of observations in each regime over time for the risk-quantitative easing 
nexus, with lending rate being the threshold variable, and the Boone indicator being the proxy for competition. 
Threshold values of lending rate are obtained from the dynamic threshold analysis, reported in Table 3. BRL 
ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
. The second row shows dependent variables, the third row shows 
the threshold values, the fourth row indicates low and high regimes, Mar: March, Sep: September, 00-15: 
2000-2015, Obs: number of observations. 
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Table 5. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus (10-year Japanese government bond yield and Bank of Japan 
assets) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BOJ assets BOJ assets BOJ assets 
Threshold estimates 1.032% 1.032% 1.484% 118,437,502 mil JPY 118,437,502 mil JPY 118,437,502 mil JPY 
95% confidence interval [1.032% 1.032%] [1.032% 1.032%] [1.484% 1.484%] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.017*** 0.0014 -0.0149*** 0.0010 0.0856*** 0.0113 -0.0347*** 0.0098 -0.0286*** 0.0050 -0.1219 0.0929 
High regime 0.0131*** 0.0049 0.0107*** 0.0028 0.6513*** 0.1882 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0010 -0.1709*** 0.0194 
Intercept -0.1427*** 0.0253 -0.1222*** 0.0151 -2.2627*** 0.8002 0.6492*** 0.1814 0.504*** 0.0910 -0.9858 1.9967 
Impact of covariates 
  
  
  
      
Boone -0.1837*** 0.0528 -0.122*** 0.0296 0.7841*** 0.2696 -0.1767*** 0.0530 -0.1151*** 0.0273 0.8562*** 0.2814 
Size -0.0232*** 0.0035 -0.0095*** 0.0026 0.058** 0.0295 -0.0245*** 0.0031 -0.0108*** 0.0023 0.0543* 0.0283 
Capital ratio -0.4923*** 0.1082 -0.0085 0.0390   -0.4981*** 0.1034 -0.0142 0.0362   
Asset diversification -0.1008*** 0.0087 -0.0602*** 0.0053 0.1431 0.1502 -0.1093*** 0.0087 -0.0691*** 0.0051 0.0609 0.1414 
Liquidity -0.0737*** 0.0111 -0.0326*** 0.0078 0.2455 0.2653 -0.0897*** 0.0116 -0.0474*** 0.0078 0.1494 0.2634 
Revenue diversification -0.0178*** 0.0046 -0.016*** 0.0035 0.1182* 0.0606 -0.0197*** 0.0043 -0.0181*** 0.0033 0.1033* 0.0562 
GDP growth 0.0847*** 0.0119 0.0712*** 0.0078 0.3185*** 0.0741 0.0081 0.0083 -0.0018 0.0053 -0.0463 0.0750 
Market capitalisation -0.0113*** 0.0018 -0.0083*** 0.0012 0.0479*** 0.0082 0.0002 0.0011 0.0028*** 0.0006 0.1032*** 0.0067 
   
  
  
      
Obs in low regime 1114 
 
1114  2898 
 
1156  1156  1156  
Obs in high regime 2377 
 
2377  593 
 
2335  2335  2335  
Notes: This Table reports the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (Boone) as its instrument. The threshold variable is 
the 10-year Japanese government bond yield and Bank of Japan (BOJ) assets. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural 
logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
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Table 6. Variance Decompositions. 
 
1 2 3 
Periods Variables QE Boone BRL ratio Variables QE Boone RSL ratio Variables QE Boone lnZ-score 
5 QE 0.9997 0.0001 0.0002 QE 0.9997 0.0001 0.0002 QE 0.9888 0.0004 0.0108 
5 Boone 0.0438 0.9561 0.0000 Boone 0.0292 0.9683 0.0025 Boone 0.0567 0.8303 0.1130 
5 BRL ratio 0.2801 0.0765 0.6434 RSL ratio 0.1168 0.0166 0.8667 lnZ-score 0.0039 0.1429 0.8532 
10 QE 0.9996 0.0001 0.0003 QE 0.9992 0.0001 0.0007 QE 0.9686 0.0012 0.0301 
10 Boone 0.0835 0.9164 0.0000 Boone 0.0614 0.9350 0.0036 Boone 0.1030 0.7729 0.1240 
10 BRL ratio 0.4679 0.0566 0.4756 RSL ratio 0.3089 0.0126 0.6785 lnZ-score 0.0068 0.1279 0.8653 
Notes: This Table reports the variance decompositions of the panel vector autoregression model for 5 and 10 periods ahead. There are 3 models, each has 3 variables: 
quantitative easing QE proxied by the lending rate, competition proxied by the Boone indicator, and risk. Column 1: risk is represented as bankrupt loan (BRL) ratio, column 
2: risk is restructured loan (RSL) ratio, column 3: risk is taken as ln Z-score, . 
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Figure 1. The Boone Indicator and the Lerner Index 
 
Notes: This Figure illustrates the average values of the Boone indicator and the Lerner index over time. Year 
denotes financial year. 
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions-Bankrupt loan ratio 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect 
to one standard deviation shock in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing represented by bank lending rate; 
Boone is the Boone indicator of competition; BRL_ratio is bankrupt loan ratio; step: number of periods. Errors 
are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions-Restructured loan ratio 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect 
to one standard deviation shock in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing represented by bank lending rates; 
Boone is the Boone indicator of competition; RSL_ratio is restructured loan ratio; step: number of periods. 
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions-Bank stability 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect 
to one standard deviation shock in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing represented by bank lending rate; 
Boone is the Boone indicator of competition; lnz is the natural logarithm of Z-score 
; step: number of periods. Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-
Carlo simulation. 
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Bankrupt and  
quasi-bankrupt assets 
Total loans     Other assets 
Problem assets based on the 
Financial Reconstruction Law 
Risk-monitored loans 
Total loans 
  
Doubtful assets 
Substandard loans 
(A) 
Bankrupt loans 
Non-accrual loans 
Past due loans (3 
months or more) 
Restructured loans 
(B) 
Other assets 
(C) 
Appendix A. Problem Assets Based on the Financial Reconstruction Law and Risk-
Monitored Loans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: (A) – (B) = (C) 
Notes: This Appendix presents the two classifications of problem assets in Japan. The difference between the 
two is other assets which are nonperforming assets (claims related to securities lending, foreign exchanges, 
accrued interests, suspense payments, customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guarantees, and bank-
guaranteed bonds sold through private placements). Risk-monitored loans are disclosed in accordance with 
the Banking Law. In this paper, Bankrupt loans are named after the sum of Bankrupt loans and Non-accrual 
loans; Restructured loans are named after the sum of past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 months 
and Restructured loans (The Japanese Bankers Association originally defined restructured loans as loans of 
which interest rates had been lowered. In 1997, the definition was extended to loans with any amended 
contract conditions and loans to corporations under ongoing reorganisation (Montgomery and Shimizutani, 
2009)). Source: Interim report 2010-Sumitomo Mitsui Financial group.  
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Appendix B 
B.1 The marginal cost 
In order to attain values for the Boone indicator, we need to model bank marginal cost. 
In line with Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) and Fu et al. (2014), marginal cost is obtained from a 
flexible translog cost function specification18:  
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(B1) 
with total costs TCit, total earning assets Q (loans, investments, and securities) (Delis, 2012), 
price of inputs Pj (which have to satisfy the condition of homogeneity of degree one), time 
trend t and a composed error term εit. Two input prices are incorporated: i) price of funds P1 
is defined as interest expenses divided by deposits and borrowed funds; ii) price of physical 
capital and labour P2 as noninterest expenses divided by fixed assets
19. 
The marginal cost MC for bank i at time t can be derived from equation (1) as follows: 
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B.2 The Boone indicator 
The Boone indicator of competition has quite a few advantages in comparison with 
others. This measure accounts for both a lift in entry barriers or more aggressive interaction 
between market participants (Boone, 2008), while other indicators contain limitations or 
biases. As Beck (2008) argues, concentration ratios such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
and three (five)-bank concentration ratio are rather unreliable measures of competition as 
they only weigh concentration levels. Concentration ratio could rise following an increase in 
competition, as uncompetitive participants would have to exit the market. Hence, if one 
                                                          
18
 Subscripts (it) are omitted for simplification. 
19
 Due to data unavailability, we are unable to extract data from general and administrative expenses 
which include personnel expenses and non-personnel expenses associated to physical capital. Hence, we 
define the second input price in line with Fu et al. (2014). 
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interpreted higher concentration ratios as a proxy for uncompetitive markets, the results 
could be misleading (Schaeck & Cihák, 2014). Other measures of competition such as the 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and Lerner index also have some limitations. While H-statistic 
requires a priori assumption of long-run equilibrium operating markets (Panzar & Rosse, 
1987), it is ambiguous whether the Lerner index captures the degree of product 
substitutability (Vives, 2008). Mirzaei and Moore (2014) argue that the H-statistic does not 
embrace the evolution of bank competition as there is only one score obtained over time. 
Even though time-varying scores are achievable (Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Jeon et al., 2011), 
they are either increasing or decreasing which may be inapplicable in effect. 
Introduced by Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2008), firms’ (banks’) market power can 
be measured through profit elasticity β in a simple profit equation: 
ititit umc  lnln         (B3) 
where πit and mcit are profit and marginal costs of bank i at time t. β is the Boone indicator 
of market power which is expected to be negative as higher marginal costs would result in 
lower profits. Intuitively, in a competitive market, inefficient banks signified by 
comparatively high marginal costs are penalised more harshly since they will endure high 
loss in profits, compared to operating in an uncompetitive market. Hence, the larger the 
absolute value of β, the more intense the degree of competition. 
In our paper, we employ the non-parametric methodology used in Delis (2012) to 
compute the Boone indicator for individual banks in each period. This allows us to create 
bank level estimates of competition. We estimate equation (3) by using a local regression 
analysis20, which fits the relation between log profits and log marginal costs on the 
neighbourhood subsample of each observation to obtain individual βit.
21 
                                                          
20 According to Loader (1999), a local regression 
iii xY   )(  with predictor variable x and response variable 
Y is estimated by smoothing the unknown function )( ix . This is obtained through fitting a polynomial model 
within a sliding window of x. Each point in the neighbourhood of x is assigned a weight corresponding to its 
distance from x. In particular, the closer the point to x, the larger its weight. The next step is to choose an 
optimal bandwidth h which controls the smoothness of fit and a smoothing window (x-h(x), x+h(x)). In other 
words, for each observation xi, all neighbour points within the sliding window h are used in the following 
locally weighted least squares criterion:    210
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B.3 The Lerner index 
We also use the Lerner index, another proxy of bank market power, to achieve a 
comprehensive analysis with different indicators of competition. The Lerner index is 
formulated as follows: 
 
itQititQit
PMCPLerner /         (B4) 
where
itQ
P is output price calculated as operating income divided by earning assets. This 
indicator captures pricing ability above marginal cost, which has been used extensively in 
the banking literature (Berger et al., 2009; Fiordelisi & Mare, 2014; Fu et al., 2014; Koetter 
et al., 2012). Values of the index are bounded between 0 and 1, with the former presenting 
perfect competition while the latter indicating pure monopoly. A negative Lerner index 
entails inability to price above marginal cost which might be a consequence of non-optimal 
behaviour (Fu et al., 2014). 
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where    xhxxu i / . Following Delis (2012), we use the 
generalised cross-validation method to obtain our bandwidth of 0.42. 
 
21
 In regression (B3), the Boone indicator is averaged over the entire sample across the whole examined 
period. Put differently, it cannot be measured for individual banks. To overcome this drawback, empirical 
research has modified this model to yield values of β for each period (Schaeck & Cihák, 2014; Van Leuvensteijn 
et al., 2011) by adding a time dummy and its interaction with marginal costs in order to increase the frequency 
of the indicator. However, the number of observations achieved from this approach does not rise significantly 
as they are average values for each period. 
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